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The Cost of Ordinality
Marek Pycia (UCLA)⇤
1 Introduction
School districts and many other institutions allocating objects without the use of transfers
rely on mechanisms that only elicit agents’ ordinal preferences. Abdulkadiroglu, Che, and
Yasuda (2011a) demonstrated that mechanisms eliciting carinal preferences can do better.1
How large is the welfare loss? The present note shows that this loss can be arbitrarily large.
2 The Main Result
Consider a finite set of objects X = {1, ..., |X|} such that each object x is represented by a
number of identical copies |x|   0. Consider also a finite set of agents I = {1, ..., |I|}, each of
whom demands at most one object copy and evaluates the outcomes in line with the expected
utility theory based on her von Neumann-Morgenstein utilities.
As Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1998) and Bogomolnaia
and Moulin (2001), we are interested in random assignments in which each agent i obtains a
probability distribution over objects µ (i, ·) and the distribution satisfies the feasibility con-
straints X
i2I
µ (i, x)  |x| .
In this environment, there is an e ciency cost (in terms of the sum of agents’ utilities) of
restricting attention to ordinal strategy-proof mechanism. This e ciency cost depends on the
number of object copies and the profile of agents’ utilities. The loss can be zero, for instance
when there is a su cient number of object copies to allocate each agent her most preferred
object. As shown by Abdulkadiroglu, Che, and Yasuda (2011a), the loss can be positive. The
goal of this note is to show that the loss can be arbitrarily large.
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1Such cardinal mechanisms has been studied, for instance, by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), and Ab-
dulkadiroglu, Che, and Yasuda (2011b).
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Theorem 1. For each K > 0 there is an economy and a preference profile such that the welfare
of the optimal allocation is at least K times larger than the welfare of any regular, symmetric,
asymptotic strategy-proof, and asymptotically ordinally e cient ordinal mechanism.
Before embarking on the proof, let us notice that the optimal allocation can be achieved
for instance in the pseudomarket mechanism of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). Since the
pseudomarket mechanism is not necessarily incentive-compatible in finite-size markets, we
discuss below two simple mechanisms that achieve the K times better allocation in a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. It is su cient to construct an appropriate example. Consider k + l agents where
l = |X|  1 and k is much larger than l and |X|. Let agents i = 1, ..., k rank objects as follows
1  i 2  i ...  i |X|, and have valuations v1i = 1 and vxi close to 0 for objects x = 2, ..., |X|.
For instance we can set vxi = (n  x) ✏ for x = 2, ..., |X| and some very small ✏ > 0. Let each
agent k  1 + ` for ` = 2, ..., l have valuations v1k 1+` = 1 and v`k 1+` = 1  ✏ and have utility
from all other objects close to 0.
Let us replicate this economy with q copies of each above agent and q copies of each object.
Let us also add su ciently many copies of object |X| in order to assure that the supply of
copies is su cient to serve each agent.
By the main result in Liu and Pycia (2011), for large q all regular, strategy-proof, sym-
metric, and e cient ordinal mechanisms give allocations close to that of Probabilistic Serial.
Probabilistic Serial allocates objects so that everybody gets share 1k+l of object 1. Since k is
much larger than l, replicas of agents 1, ..., k get approximately shares 1k in objects 2, ..., |X|
and each replica of agent k   1 + ` for ` = 2, ..., l obtains a share of object ` that is bounded
above by ` 1k . The expected utility of each replica of agents 1, ..., k is approximately
1
k , while
the expected utility of replicas of agents k 1+ ` for ` = 2, ..., l is approximately 1k + ` 1k = `k .
The total welfare is approximately q
⇣
1 +
1
2 (l 1)(l+2)
k
⌘
, and for k much larger than l, the total
welfare is essentially q.
The welfare at the e cient allocation is bounded below by the welfare of the following
allocation. Each replica of agent k   1 + ` gets share 1 of object `, while each replica of
the remaining (identical) agents 1, ..., k gets share 1k of object 1 and the e cient allocation
of the remaining objects. The total welfare of this allocation is bounded below by q (1 + l).
Thus, this allocation is l + 1 times better than the above-computed best symmetric ordinal
allocation. QED
2.1 Implentation
As noted above, Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) mechanism achieves the e cient allocation.
For the problem at hand, there are other simpler mechanisms that achieve the allocation
constructed in the above proof, and that achieve it in Nash equilibrium. Let us look at two
such mechanisms.
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First, consider the following mechanism that modifies the mechanism of Hylland and Zeck-
hauser (1979) by fixing prices. Endow each agent with budget of 1, and allow the agents to
purchase objects at the following prices: object 1 has price k, objects 2, ..., l + 1 has price 1,
and object l+1 has price zero. If the aggregate demands can be served by the available supply,
then allocate to each agent whatever they demanded. If the aggregate demands cannot be
served by the available supply, then we ration each good proportionally to agents’ demands.
Under complete information about the preference profile from the proof of the theorem, it is a
Nash equilibrium for each agent 1, ..., k to demand quantity 1k of object 1 and quantity 1  1k
of object l + 1, and for each agent k   1 + ` for ` = 2, ..., l to demand quantity 1 of object `,
thus achieving the welfare-maximizing allocation.2
Second, consider the following mechanism that is in the spirit of the CADA mechanism
of Abdulkadiroglu, Che, and Yasuda (2011b). We ask agents for their ordinal preferences as
well for their top choice among “force an ordinal mechanism” and the following m+1 random
assignments:
x0 =
 
1
k , 0, ..., 0,
k 1
k
 
,
x` = (0, .., 0, 1, 0..., 0) with 1 in position ` where ` = 2, ..., |X|.
If all agents chose one of the options x0, ..., x|X| and if it is feasible to give everyone their
chosen assignment, then we do so. Otherwise, we run the probabilistic serial mechanism (or
another standard mechanism, for instance, random serial dictatorship). Provided the value
of the second object is su ciently low for agents 1, ..., k, under complete information and the
preference profile from the proof of the theorem, it is a Nash equilibrium for these agents to
pick x0 as their top choice while each agent k   1 + `, where ` = 2, ..., l, picks outcome x`.
Furthermore, for any preference profile, in any Nash equilibrium this mechanism is at least as
good as the ordinal mechanism used in its construction.
3 Conclusion
This note shows that there large potential welfare gains in developing cardinal mechanisms to
for no-transfer allocation in settings such as school choice.
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